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Abstract
Wireless Internet has become increasingly popular due to anywhere anytime access
feature. The Internet architecture was designed underlying the existing of the end-to-end
path connection. The promise of wireless Internet networks is to provide roaming users
connectivity anywhere anytime. However, quality of service (QoS) is still an open issue in
wireless networks, which are characterized by possible intermittent connectivity and large
transmission delays, due to user mobility, sparse mobile node distribution, link failures
(because of hostile propagation medium), and/or other high-priority traffic.
In this thesis, a credit-based user authentication scheme is proposed for delay toler-
ant mobile wireless networks. The proposed authentication scheme isolates the uncertain
network condition in the high-delay wireless backhaul with high error rate, and accel-
erates the overall authentication process when the mobile terminal roams in the visited
network. Furthermore, an analytical study of overall network performance is presented for
the authentication scheme in terms of authentication cost and delay. Simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed credit-based authentication scheme reduces the overall real
time transaction cost and delay for delay tolerant mobile wireless networks.
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In the past decade, the development of wireless communication technologies made the
Internet ubiquitously. There are a number of wireless technologies such as broadband
wireless, 3G network; however, wireless local area networks (WLANs) have become more
popular than the others because of the availability of the unlicensed spectrum of WLANs.
Moreover, the increasing use of laptops, tablets, and personal digital assistants (PDAs),
and the decreasing cost of WLAN equipment, such as access points (APs), made WLANs
ubiquitous. The WLANs are based on IEEE 802.11 standard [1, 2]. Thus, the low cost,
high capacity, easy deployment, and the speed of wireless networks have pushed clients and
small companies to create wireless networks instead of wired networks. Developing wireless
Internet access over long distance is potentially to be invested [3]. Wireless metropolitan
area networks (MANs) based on IEEE 802.16 (worldwide interoperability for microwave
access or WiMax[4]) are currently under deployment and expected to be born soon. Not
only WiMax is created for metropolitan wide-area wireless backhaul network, but also it
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can be used for coverage extension by integrating it with other networks such as Wi-Fi
routers and relay stations.
Compare to wireline counterparts, wireless access introduces more challenges to se-
curity due to the nature of open medium. In order to provide secure wireless medium,
authentication is used as a basis to authorize the mobile terminals and exchange secret
keys.
The advantage of wireless networks is to provide roaming users with connectivity any-
where anytime. However, providing quality of service (QoS) in wireless networks is still
an open issue, which involves dynamic capacity, traffic load, and network topology. The
characteristics of wireless networks are high error rates, long transmission delays, and link
failures.
1.1 Problem Formulation
Providing QoS in wireless networks has known to be an important but difficult task. One
of the QoS metrics is transmission delay. User authentication information is delay sensitive
because it requires real time transaction. Re-authentication causes undesired authentica-
tion process in delay tolerant network (DTN). Delay tolerant network will cause unfavorable
high latency in user authentication process. Repetition of waiting time before accessing
the network can be annoying enough to mobile users. Therefore, minimizing authentica-
tion delay is important to achieve acceptable user experience without introducing more
overhead to the network.
Thus, in this thesis, a credit-based user authentication scheme for delay tolerant mobile
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wireless networks is proposed to minimize authentication delay. The proposed scheme
pre-authorizes the mobile users based on the credit record after a successful user credit
check. The benefit of the proposed credit system is that the full authentication is always
performed in the background to keep potential service loss to the minimum, which greatly
reduces the overall authentication latency with poor network condition. Furthermore, this
proposed scheme can be implemented distributively, so multi-point localized authentication
mechanisms can be used to cope with the wireless front end at the foreign network side.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of
the authentication process in wireless networks. A brief introduction about delay tolerant
networks and the proposed authentication scheme for delay tolerant mobile wireless net-
works are given in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the analytical model for evaluating the
resultant cost and delay of the proposed scheme. Performance evaluations are provided in
Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 gives conclusions and suggests further research directions.
3
Chapter 2
Authentication in Wireless Networks
The employment of wireless technologies has opened big markets worldwide. Thus, achiev-
ing secure wireless access is a very important requirement. In this chapter, we present a
general overview of authentication in section 2.1. A brief introduction about authentica-
tion mechanism is given in section 2.2. Finally, the considerations relevant to the design
of effective good authentication protocols are provided in section 2.3.
2.1 Introduction to Authentication
Authentication is defined as the process to identify legitimate users from others. There
are three parties in this process: users, home networks (HN), and foreign networks (FN).
Authentication process initiates from the users by requesting access to the foreign networks.
The foreign networks have to identify and authorize the requested users by negotiating with
their home networks. The home networks identify the legitimate users from the others.
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The responsibilities of authentication process can be summarized in the following points:
• Block unauthenticated information that may be malicious.
• Prevent illegitimate users to access network rescouses.
• Keep tracking of users’ activities.
• Make integration between/among networks easier.
Therefore, the authentication process is basically based on negotiations by exchanging
messages. The users have to submit their credentials to the foreign networks to prove their
legitimacies. Based on credentials of the users, authentication protocols can be classified.
There are two main classifications of authentication: symmetrical shared secret keys and
asymmetrical shared secret keys. Both of them have advantages and disadvantages.
Symmetrical authentications are defined as an authentication process based on recon-
figured shared secret keys between/among parties. These shared secret keys are used to en-
crypt and decrypt parties’ information. Password authentication [5] and Challenge/response
authentication [6, 7] are examples of symmetrical authentications. Symmetrical authenti-
cations are more efficient in terms of computations, but less scalable. IEEE 802.11 uses
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) as security and authentication protocols for WLANs
[8]. IEEE 802.11 as a standard was ratified in September 1999. Two years later, WEP has
been shown several security serious flaws [9]. WEP has two authentication modes: Open
and closed authentications. The open system authentication means WEP is off—which
is already considered as insecure. Since the shared key authentication is not mutually
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authenticated, only users authenticate to the network. Unfortunately, both of these au-
thentication methods have known to be failed [10].
On other hand, asymmetrical authentications are defined as the authentication pro-
cess based on public/private keys between/among parties. The sender uses the receiver’s
public key to encrypt the information and the receiver uses its private key to decrypt the
received information. RSA [11] and Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [12] are examples
of asymmetrical authentications. Asymmetrical authentications are less efficient in terms
of computations, cause more power consumptions, but more scalable.
2.2 Authentication Mechanism
In section 2.1, a brief introduction about authentications was presented. The focus of this
thesis is on integrated wireless networks. In integrated networks, a home network of a
mobile terminal (MT) is defined based on a pre-agreement. When the MT wanders into
a FN, the FN has to check the MT identity by contacting its HN. Figure 2.1 shows the
authentication mechanism that has two dimension charges, overhead cost and delay. The
effect of authentication on network performance can be easily seen in Figure 2.1. As the
number of (re)authentications increases, the overhead increases. In this work, the overhead
cost is defined as the number of message exchanges. In case of these message exchanges
have been either lost or traveling through multihops, the MT will get annoyed and try to
issue another request in order to access the FN. When the number of hops increases between
the FN and HN, the message delays increase too. In case of communication links never
disconnect, there are some obvious components causing delay at each hop ( i.e. queueing,
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transmission, propagation, and waiting time) [13].
In this thesis, a generic scenario is considered when a FN needs to authenticate MTs
and the MTs always roam into a FN. If a MT makes a new connection in a subnet of a FN,
it calls for session authentication. When the MT moves from the current subnet into a new
subnet within the FN, this is known as intra-domain handoff authentication. However, if
the MT moves from the current subnet into a new subnet outside the current FN, this is
known as inter-domain handoff authentication [14]. Whenever the MT needs to make a
new connection or handoff an existing connection, the MT needs to be authenticated.
2.3 Objectives of Designing Authentication Protocols
The necessity of designing robust and efficient authentication protocols is apparent in wire-
less today’s applications. The requirements of authentication protocols can be summarized
in the following points:
Security Robustness : It is the main objective in designing security protocols. Au-
thentication protocols should prevent any type of attack such as man-in-the-middle
and replay attack. Most, if not all, of authentication protocols consider security
robustness as one of the major components during the design.
Power efficiency : Authentication protocols should use less power especially for mobile
users which are known to have limited power.
Network efficiency : Authentication schemes should maintain the overhead as low as
possible; fast authentication process is preferable in user’s points of view.
7
Figure 2.1: Authentication process
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Network diversity : For heterogenous networks, authentication schemes should consid-
erate the characteristics of different networks. In particular, Wireless networks are
different than wired networks so that authentication protocols should take into ac-




for Delay Tolerant Networks
WLANs have become very popular due to low cost, easy deployment, and ubiquitous Inter-
net access. The promising of metropolitan Internet access changes the future of networking
by meaning of multihop wireless networks. However, enabling Internet access in multihop
wireless networks makes Internet more challenging [15], mainly due to the increasing delays.
In this chapter, we first provide a general overview of delay tolerant networks in section
3.1. We present the related work in section 3.2, followed by the problem formulation in
section 3.3. Finally, the credit-based authentication for delay tolerant networks that have
high latency is proposed in section 3.4.
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3.1 Delay Tolerant Networks
3.1.1 Background
The success of Internet protocol was based assumedly on the existing end-to-end connection
path. If this connection path is intermittent, the Internet protocol stacks are not behave
well [16, 17, 18, 19]. The major problem with Internet protocol is transmission control
protocol (TCP) . TCP does not work well in high delay networks because TCP requires
three-way handshaking to establish a connection and this three-handshaking takes 1.5
round-trip times (RTTs) [16]. In high delay networks, one round-trip may take minutes,
hours, or even days. Thus, a TCP connection may not successfully established before
timeout. Let’s consider some examples:
• The idea of delay tolerant networks was mainly from interplanetary network (IPN) by
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) [17, 18]. NASA’s objectives
were to make the communication between the Earth and spacecrafts, or remote areas
in the Moon, as smooth as the communications between two people in the Earth. The
main difficulties of space communication arise high propagation delays and variations
of delays.
• In sensor networks, sensor devices are planted on animals to track and protect them.
Due to the nature of animals migration, connections between these portable trans-
mitters and the central base station are intermitted. So, intermittent links cause high
delay.
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3.1.2 Characteristics of Delay Wireless Tolerant Networks
The wireless network is characterized by possible intermittent connectivity and large trans-
mission delays due to user mobility, sparse mobile node distribution, link failures (because
of hostile propagation medium), or other high-priority traffic. Although multiple-hop wire-
less backhaul extends the coverage, such characteristics cause even more performance im-
pact with the deployment of multi-hop wireless backhaul due to transmission failure in any
hop resulting in failed end-to-end packet delivery.
For better understanding, it is very important to characterize the DTNs. The main
concern in challenged networks is delay. The characteristics of the DTNs can be viewed as
communication link characteristics and end system capabilities [19]. It could be described
as follows:
Path and Link Characteristics Disconnections of communication links, low data rates,
high transmission delays, high propagation delays, node motilities, and/or high error
rates in communication media are some forms of DTN characteristics.
End System Capabilities End systems are limited power, bounded memory space, and/or
low processing capability. For instance, if end mobile systems have power-life less
than connection time occurred.
3.1.3 Solutions
Some solutions have been proposed in the literature in order to adapt the Internet stack
to unusual behavior networks. Proxies are an example which are placed on the boundary
to deal with these networks. These proxies have either limited scalabilities or wasted
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resources [19]. Thus, new and back compatible network architecture is needed to manage
the behaviors of the challenged networks and to map among different types of networks.
While most multimedia data are loss tolerable, it is a good idea to apply the concept
of delay tolerant network (DTN) [19] to the mobile wireless network when delivering
integrity sensitive data, such as secure bank transactions, stock information, etc. The DTN
was originally designed for multihop interplanetary communications [18], where extreme
long transmission delay and high error rate are expected. Generally, the DTN nodes use
store and forward technique so that costly end-to-end re-transmission in poor transmission
channel can be avoided [19].
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) created a research group for DTN called Delay-
Tolerant Networking Research Group (DTNRG) . This group is concerns how to propose an
architectural and protocol design principles arising from the need to provide interoperable
communications with and among extreme and performance-challenged environments where
continuous end-to-end connectivity cannot be assumed [20]. The DNTRG is developing
two main protocols bundle protocol [21] and licklider transmission protocol (LTP) [22] .
The difference between LTP and bundle protocol is that LTP is a point-to-point protocol
meaning that there are no routing and congestion overhead involved, but bundle protocol is
not. Bundle protocol is an overlay protocol to support delay tolerant between application
interfaces and transport layer [20, 19]. In Internet stack, bundle protocol places above
TCP/UDP protocol.
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3.1.4 Integrated all-IP Delay Tolerant Networks
Figure 3.1 shows a generic all IP-based mobile wireless network infrastructure with hetero-
geneous network connectivity. The wireless front end radio access technologies, denoted
as access point (AP) in the figure 3.1, may include cellular mobile networks for large ser-
vice areas and IEEE802.11/16 for high-rate transmission over service hot spots. Mobile
IP (MIP) protocol [23] [24] is applied to support IP mobility for mobile clients. It can
be seen in the figure, multiple hop IEEE802.16 backhauls, as well as the satellite link,
are key components to greatly extend the Internet service. The service providers include
well-know major network carriers and independent vendors. The home networks of those
independent vendors may be connected to the IEEE802.16 backhaul, such as HN2 in the
figure.
In the future, we are going to face more challenged networks, such networks like inter-
planetary internet, sensor networks, and deep space communication. It has been shown
that Internet protocols do not work well in some challenged networks and a lot of research
has been studied the literature [16, 17, 19].
Therefore, the efficiency of packet transportation can be greatly improved without
losing delivery guarantee, and the minimum deployment density of wireless backhaul hubs
(BHs) can be further reduced.
3.2 Related Works
Much research has been introduced related to single or multi-integrated mobile wireless
networks [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Integrated wireless networks have been extensively studied
14
Figure 3.1: Delay tolerant integrated mobile wireless networks
in the literature [25, 26]. In [27], an integration scheme is proposed by active interaction
authentication scheme. It can be done through a secured Web page for login over a hy-
pertext transport protocol secured (HTTPS) connection. This scheme does not provide
seamless roaming. Other authentication schemes in [28], [29] and [30] are made by local-
izing at the foreign network (FN) to reduce delay and overhead. However, the cached
user credential is stored only in the FA . These schemes do not work properly in challenge
networks due to unauthenticated data voyaged.
Authentication affects both security and QoS [31, 32, 33]. Plenty of research works have
analyzed authentication systems by the meaning of security robustness. Researchers have
analyzed authentication protocols in terms of network performance [34, 35, 14]. They have
studied challenge/response authentication based in wireless networks in terms of signaling
15
and processing load of cryptographic techniques.
3.3 Research Objectives
The main objective of the thesis is to propose an authentication scheme for delay tolerant
networks, and to analyze and evaluate the scheme in terms of overhead cost and authen-
tication delay. The proposed scheme inherits the idea from our daily life. Credit system
has been tightly integrated into our society. It has been proven that credit system works
very well and effectively, as seen from the economics system point’s view. Typically, credit
system takes small risk for greater benefit, considering that most, if not all, members in
the society are rational.
3.4 Credit-Based Authentication Architecture
Authentication protocols are the basis of security fundamentals. Based on the authentica-
tion protocols, a responder can verify and authority the requester’s identity based on the
responder’s policy. The authentication in networking is that a requester needs to authenti-
cate itself by sending out authenticated information to the attachment’s point, responder.
The responder responses based on its policy.
In the delay tolerant mobile networks, the major effecting is delay. This delay can
be caused by multi-hop wireless backhaul, link failure, or high channel errors. Most au-
thentication protocols are synchronized meaning that the FA can not allow the MT to get
access into its network unless the FA receives positive acknowledgement from the HA. As a
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result, the legitimate mobile user should be able to access the network as soon as possible.
Therefore, authentication process should eliminate the effect of the long delay.
In this thesis, the credit-based user authentication for delay tolerant networks is pro-
posed [36]. Authentication credit is created for the mobile terminal when the mobile termi-
nal accesses the network service. Before a mobile terminal accesses the network service of
the FN, the FA performs authentication process to check the legitimate of the attempted
MT. If the authentication process is positively successful, the FN registers the legitimate
MT. Subsequently, if the MT reattempts access the FN, the FA should avoid full authen-
tication due to the good history of the MT. Credit-based system is proposed to speed up
the authentication process. In reality, credit system has been emerged in our society and
it works very effective. The benefits of the credit-based user authentication reduce the
overall overhead, decrease the authentication delay, and allow more users to access. The
downside of the credit authentication system is the time, which is called credit time T crediti ,
of whether the HA having acknowledged negatively or timeout. Credit system, typically,
takes small risk for greater benefit.
The proposed credit authentication process is demonstrated in Figure 3.2. When the
MT sends authentication request to the FA through the attachment’s point BH or AP, the
front end checks whether the MT has an authentication credit (AC) or not. If the MT does
not have an AC, the authentication request is forwarded until it reaches the foreign agency
(FA). The FA verifies the MT legitimacy with the home agency (HA) with tolerance delay.
If the HA responses positively, the FA approves the MT’s access request and assigns a
credit to the MT and each hub along its path. The authentication delay is expected to be
high because it is first verification. If either the HA responses negatively or the tolerance
17
Figure 3.2: Flow chart of proposed credit-based authentication scheme
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delay is reached, the access will be denied.
Whenever the MT re-accesses the FN, based on its access location, the MT is allowed
to access and at the same time the authentication credit is verified with its HA. A full
authentication is performed in the background; therefore, the MT isolates from the possible
long delay. When the FA receives a positive acknowledgment, the FA verifies and renews
the credit to the MT and each hub along the path. The credit is revoked by either the
HA’s acknowledgment being negative or the tolerance delay reaching credit time T crediti .
This implies the MT’s account standing is not valid.
3.4.1 Authentication Credit
We define the authentication credit ACi = ACIDi|| IDM || refi|| expi : SigF , where ACIDi
denotes the identity of the authentication credit assigned by the FA, refi denotes the
authentication credit reference code, and expi denotes the authentication credit expiration
time. The FA stores the mapping ACi ←→ IDH ←→ ki in its database after it receives
positive verification of the MT from the HA. A parameter called pre-approval timeout
T crediti is defined based on the expected time to receive the response from the HA and is
used in the visited network internally. This parameter defines the absolute time when the





This chapter presents an analytical model for evaluating the authentication scheme and
estimating a proper credit time (T crediti ) for each wireless network i. The cost is defined
as the overhead message exchanges in the overall network. Delay is defined as the time
elapsed of sending a packet from a source to a destination. This chapter is divided into
two parts. The cost analysis is presented in Section 4.1. Secondly, the delay model is
introduced in Section 4.2.
4.1 Cost Analysis
We assume that there are N hotspot networks so that the mobile user may show up to
any one of them at anytime. The mobility pattern of the MT is based on the residence
20
time which is assumed to be exponentially distributed random variables with rate ξi (i =
1, 2, . . . , N).
Let Φ(t) denotes a process that tracks the MT at which network is connected at the
time t. Therefore, the process Φ(t) can be modeled as a continuous markov process, as
shown in Figure 4.1. By sampling the random process Φ(t) after time instances tk = k ∗ δ,
where δ < (maxiξi)
−1 ∀i, the new sampled process Φ(tk) is a markov chain [37], in the





1− p1 p1 ∗ q12 p1 ∗ q13 . . . p1 ∗ q1N
p2 ∗ q21 1− p2 p2 ∗ q23 . . . p2 ∗ q2N










where pi = 1 − e−ξiδ for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . qij is the roaming probability from the WLANi
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i=1 qi,j = 1. Q matrix is to distinguish access probability from WLANi to WLANj
for ∀i, j ∈ S.
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Figure 4.1: Mobile user roaming
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4.1.1 Average Overhead Cost
We are interested in defining the overhead cost as the cost-function. The overhead cost C
is defined as the average authentication message exchanges requiring real-time transactions





where πi is the long-run proportion of time that the process will be in state i and Ci is equal
to Pri{credit exit}Ccrediti + (1− Pri{credit exit})Cno crediti , where Ccrediti and Cno crediti are
average overhead costs in roaming to wireless network i with stored authentication credit,
and wireless network i without stored authentication credit, respectively. Pri{credit exit}
is the probability that the MT revisits the wireless network i before the credit expired,
i.e., the MT revisits within the time interval k. If k is equal to zero, full authentication is
needed. Otherwise, full authentication is performed in the background. Pri{credit exit}




αj ∗ Zkji. (4.4)
α is defined as a vector (e.g. α = [α1, α2, . . . , αN ]), where αj is the initial probability




c, and Z matrix can be obtained by
replacing ith row of matrix P by its identity matrix.
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4.1.2 Average Credit Time
We are interested in estimating the credit time for long term. It can be defined as the







where πi is the long-run proportion of time that the process will be in state i and T
c
i is
equal to Pri{credit exits} T crediti . Denoting that T crediti is the credit time and Pri{credit
exits} is the probability of revisiting WLANi before the ticket, T crediti , is expired.
4.2 Delay Analysis
We consider independent wireless networks and they are partially connected, but there is
always a path from any source to any destination based on a routing algorithm R. When
a mobile node roams to a new area, it needs to be authenticated by a new foreign agent
(FA).
A packet delay of one-round trip from a source to a destination can be modeled as a





where Ti is the packet time duration at each hop i towards to its destination. We use
M/G/1 queuing model for each node. The service time is the time when a packet arrives
at the next hop successfully followed by its acknowledgement including retransmission
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the packet when corrupted packet occurs. M/G/1 uses first come first served (FCFS)
scheduling scheme.
Each hop h has Poisson arrival at rate λh, and a general service distribution is denoted
as µh of single channel. We do not consider the processing delay at each hop. The average





W ∗h (s) =
s(1− ρh)








is utilization factor. W ∗h (s) is the Laplace transform of the queuing waiting
time distribution respect to W ∗(s) =
∫∞
0
e−sydW (y). The total time that a packet spent
in hop h is
Th = W h + Xh (4.9)





where G∗h(s) is the Laplace transform of the service time distribution and T
∗
h (s) is the
Laplace transform of the distribution of the total time spent at hop h. The average packet









T ∗i (s), (4.12)
where D∗(s) is the Laplace distribution of one roundtrip time. The summation of the
random variable Ti over i is the convolution.
4.2.1 Average Authentication Delay
The performance metric of interest is to study the average authentication delay when a
roaming mobile user wanders and sends an authentication request to any FA. The FA does
the authentication process to admit this mobile user by contacting HA. Therefore, the
integration among wireless service providers is easier and more seamless.
The reason of choosing authentication delay is that MT can not send or receive during
this time. If the MT needs to hand off to a new FA, the FA needs to authenticate the
MT before handing off. When the authentication delay is high, it will cut off the ongoing
connection during handoff, which bothers the MT.
In this thesis, we define the authentication delay as the time that a mobile node sends
authentication request until it receives authentication reply. So, the authentication delay
can be divided into the time for authentication request (MT → FA → · · · → HA)
and the time for authentication replay (HA → · · · → FA → MT ). Then, the average
authentication request is the summation of the average time needed at each hop from the
MT to the HA, and the average authentication response is the summation of the average
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time takes at each hop from HA to the MT.
Thus, the average authentication delay A is the average authentication request plus
average authentication response. We assume that the route of the authentication request
is the same as the authentication response passing the same number of hops. First, the
average authentication request delay is equal to TM +
∑h+1
i=1 Ti, where TM is the average
service time of MT to send authentication packet to FA. Since MT does not have packets
in its queue except authentication request packet, TM is equal to XM . Second,
∑h+1
i=1 Ti +
T F is the average authentication response delay where T F is the average time to send
authentication response from FA to MT. If Ti is independent identically distributed random
variable for all nodes including mobile nodes, the average authentication delay is
A = TM + 2(H + 1)T i + T F , (4.13)
where H is the average number of hops.
4.2.2 Distribution of Authentication Delay
We are interested in finding the distribution of average authentication delay P (A > d).
Using central limit theorem [39], distribution of average authentication delay tends to the












QA(d) = P (A > d) is the Q-function of the authentication delay that the probability
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of the authentication delay excesses d. Intuitively, when d is large enough, QA(d) tends to
zero. QA(d) is important since it indicates how much time should be given to a roaming user
in order not to maintain the connection until the approval comes. If the pre-approval time
is too short, it will cause unfavorable connection cutoff. However, very long pre-approval




In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of credit-based user authentication scheme
in terms of the overhead cost and delay. The overhead of real time transactions (message
exchanges) is presented in section 5.1 . Since authentication information is delay sensitive,
it is very important to speed up the authentication process. Authentication delay of the
proposed model is given in section 5.2. Moreover, the estimation for credit time T crediti is
given in section 5.3. The credit time is the pre-approval time until these connections are
approved otherwise they will be blocked.
5.1 Cost Evaluation
The overhead cost function is defined according to Equation 4.3 . It includes the average
authentication message exchanges involving real time transaction per MT at each wireless
network. Table 5.1 gives the parameters that are used for both analytical and simulation.
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Table 5.1: Parameters for Simulation Results
Parameter Values
Mean residence times (1/ξ1, 1/ξ2) (1/ξ) slots
Number of service providers in WLAN1
(Agreement Networks)
10
Number of service providers in WLAN2
(Independent Networks)
20
Sampling time interval δ = 1/(2ξ) slot
WLAN 1 and 2 hotsopts average roam-
ing overhead cost with/without cached
credentials {Cticketi /Cnoticketi }
(2/4, 2/4) hops
Credit time (T credit1 , T
credit
2 ) (0, 300) slots
Packet arrival rate λ at each hop 50 packets/slot
Number of hops H 5
We assume mobility is uniformly distributed.
As stated early, one of the objectives in designing authentication schemes is to reduce
the overhead. Figure 5.1 shows that the overhead cost reduces when credit-based user
authentication is employed for different values of residence times of the MT. As the resi-
dence time decreases, the overhead decreases. When the MT is legitimate, the AC renewal
process reduces the authentication overhead effectively. In order to validate our analytical
model, a C++ program simulation is developed [40] [41]. As shown in Figure 5.1, the
simulation results match the analytical results well.
As mention in Section 4.1.2, the service providers would like to know how much un-
profitable time is given to the mobile users. Our calculation using Equation 4.5 gives the
average time credit. Figure 5.2 shows average time credit versus authentication credit
expiration for different values of residence times of the MT. As the credit time expiration
increases, the unprofitable time increases. As shown in the figure, the simulation results
30





























1/ξ = 100, Analytical
1/ξ = 100, Simualtion
1/ξ = 200, Analytical
1/ξ = 200, Simualtion
1/ξ = 300, Analytical
1/ξ = 300, Simualtion
Figure 5.1: Overhead cost vs. authentication credit expiration
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match the analytical results well.
From Figures 5.1 and 5.2, there is a tradoff between the overhead and credit time.
Choosing the authentication credit expiration is important, and finding the optimal value
for the authentication credit expiration is our future research direction.






















1/ξ = 100, Analytical
1/ξ = 100, Simualtion
1/ξ = 200, Analytical
1/ξ = 200, Simualtion
1/ξ = 300, Analytical
1/ξ = 300, Simualtion
Figure 5.2: Average authentication time vs. authentication credit expiration
5.2 Delay Evaluation
We are interested in how long authentication process will take. We assume the packet
arrival rate at each hop is given by λ = 50 packets/slots, while the packet service rate of
32






























σ2 = 0.01, credit effective
σ2 = 0.1, credit effective
σ2 = 0.01, credit ineffective
σ2 = 0.1, credit ineffective
Figure 5.3: Average authentication delay vs. service utilization factor
each hop is variable and denoted by packets/slot. The packet service time can be described
as the time for transmitting a packet correctly to the next hop towards to its destination.
Figure 5.3 shows the average authentication delay vs. service utilization factor per hop
with different wireless channel variance σ with different authentication types when Table
5.1 is used. As the channel variance increases, the average authentication delay increases
as well dramatically. It can be observed that the proposed authentication scheme could
significantly reduce the authentication latency in the delay tolerant wireless network where
the channel condition is usually not good or the connection is intermitted. We assume the
call admission control is employed at each hop so that no traffic density is more than
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ρ = 0.9 as shown in the Figure 5.3.
5.3 Estimating Credit Time T crediti
In implementing pre-approval mechanism, it is important to set pre-authentication timeout
properly since it is not profitable to set the timeout unnecessary too long, and too short
setting will cause annoying network connection cutoff. Figure 5.4 shows the probability
of authentication time versus the time line for different wireless channel condition. We
assume 90% utilization factor. It can be seen that the background authentication time
varies based on the wireless channel condition. The background authentication process
at poor channel condition σ2 = 0.2 needs up to almost twice as long as the one at good
channel condition σ2 = 0.0. Therefore, the result obtained from the figure can be used for
estimating proper setting for the credit time T crediti .
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ρ = 0.9, σ2 = 0
ρ = 0.9, σ2 = 0.01
ρ = 0.9, σ2 = 0.1
ρ = 0.9, σ2 = 0.2
Figure 5.4: Probability of the authentication delay distribution
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Works
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, a credit-based user authentication scheme has been presented for delay
tolerant mobile wireless networks. The proposed authentication scheme adopts renewable
authentication credit and multi-point localized authentication mechanisms to isolate the
user authentication process from uncertain network condition in the wireless backhaul. A
mobile user is very likely to be able to access the network resource without excess waiting
in the visited network. The performance evaluation has been provided to demonstrate
that the proposed credit-based authentication scheme is secure and effectively reduces




Although the proposed credit-based user authentication scheme is mainly designed for delay
tolerant mobile wireless networks, this scheme can be applied to delay and loss tolerant
networks, or the Internet. However, The major difference is the credit time T crediti . Thus,
adapting model for estimating the credit time is an important aspect. For example, the
credit time for wired Internet should not be the same as that for the wireless Internet, in
other words, the credit time for wired Internet is very less than for the wireless Internet .
Since the authentication credit is distributed, we should avoid comprised authentica-
tion credit. Moreover, this authentication credit can be more helpful in the sense that
authenticated data can be routed through hops and those hops can build a credit history
for this mobile user and its home network.
Our credit system can be based on authenticated or not authenticated history. The
credit system can exploit more than ”Yes” or ”No” history. It can track the mobile users’
activities and/or its home network for further security and/or billing proposes. Moreover,
the authentication credit could be used as an identification (ID) and hides the real identity
of the mobile user.
There are some other issues related to delay tolerant networks: security and routing.
Security has been an open issue, so there are still some security issues that need to be
considered in DTNs [42, 43]. For example, denial of service (DoS) attacks is very serious.
To resolve DoS attacks, randomized ID could be used. Routing in delay tolerant networks
is different than other networks because of the mobility and/or link disconnection [44].
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